Fraud detection through inference

ABSTRACT

A fraud detection system within a fuel dispenser includes the ability to measure the amount of fuel dispensed through the fuel dispenser. The measurement is compared to a value independently created representing what the amount of fuel dispensed should approximate. If the values are not comparable, an alarm may be generated to indicate that the fuel dispenser has been modified to perpetrate fraud upon the customers. In particular, a reference used in the comparison is created from data known to contain fraudulent information. If there is a match between the reported profile and the known fraudulent material an alarm may be generated.

RELATED APPLICATIONS

The present application is related to the concurrently filed, commonlyinvented, commonly assigned application Ser. No. 09/494,825, entitledFUEL DISPENSER FRAUD DETECTION SYSTEM; application Ser. No. 09/494,898,entitled FRAUD DETECTION THROUGH FLOW RATE ANALYSIS; application Ser.No. 09/494,902, entitled FRAUD DETECTION THROUGH TIME ANALYSIS;application Ser. No. 09/495,024, entitled FRAUD DETECTION THROUGH TANKMONITOR ANALYSIS; application Ser. No. 09/495,027, entitled FRAUDDETECTION THROUGH GENERAL INFERENCE; and application Ser. No.09/494,903, entitled FRAUD DETECTION THROUGH VAPOR RECOVERY ANALYSIS,which are all hereby incorporated by reference.

BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION

1. Field of the Invention

The present invention relates to a scheme for detecting fraudulentactivity related to fuel dispensing transactions, and more particularlyto a methodology designed to check independently for fraud withoutrelying on a fuel dispensing meter by comparing output from the fueldispenser or associated elements to known fraudulent data.

2. Description of the Related Art

Fuel dispensing transactions are a somewhat opaque process to mostcustomers. The customer drives up, makes a fuel grade selection anddispenses fuel into a vehicle or approved container. When the fueldispenser shuts off, the customer may check the gauge and see that heowes some amount of money for some amount of fuel dispensed.Alternatively, the customer may only have limited funds and mayterminate the transaction upon reaching the budgeted amount as displayedon the face of the fuel dispenser. The financial side of the transactionis completed and the customer drives off.

Behind the scenes, the fuel dispenser is keeping careful track of theamount of fuel dispensed so that it may be reported to the customer aswell as providing a running tally of how much it will cost the customerto purchase the fuel already dispensed. This is typically achieved witha flow meter and a pulser. When a known quantity of fuel has passedthrough the flow meter, the pulser generates a pulse. Typically, 1000pulses are generated per gallon of fuel dispensed. The number of pulsesmay be processed by an internal microprocessor to arrive at an amount offuel dispensed and a cost associated therewith. These numbers aredisplayed to the customer to aid him in making fuel dispensingdecisions.

Customers of fuel dispensers expect honest and accurate calculations ofthe cost of fuel actually dispensed into their vehicle and rely on thefuel dispenser display to provide the correct figures. However,unscrupulous individuals may, with little effort, modify the pulser andother internal electronics within the fuel dispenser to provideinaccurate readings, in effect, artificially accelerating the perceivedrate of fuel dispensing and charging the consumer for fuel that was notactually dispensed. The mechanisms normally responsible for detectingand preventing this sort of fraud are often the mechanisms that aremodified or replaced in the process, completely circumventing any fraudprevention device.

Thus, there remains a need in the field of fuel dispensing to provide anmethod to detect fraud within fuel dispensing transactions and providethe appropriate alerts to rectify the situation.

SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION

The limitations of the prior art are addressed by providing one or moreof a matrix of fraud detection schemes that attempt to verifyindependently of the data reported to the control system the amount offuel dispensed. If the inferential fuel dispensing observations do notconfirm expected fuel dispensing transactions, an alarm may begenerated. There are several schemes that could be implemented to detectthe fraud according to inferential fuel dispensing observations.

The first scheme would be to check the vapor recovery system anddetermine at what rate the vapor was being recovered. Improved monitorsallow accurate determinations of how much vapor has been recovered. Ifthe vapor recovered is not comparable to the amount of fuel allegedlydispensed, then fraud may be present. Furthermore, comparing vaporrecovery rates between fuel dispensers may also provide a hint that oneor more dispensers have been modified to produce fraudulenttransactions.

The second scheme includes comparing flow rates between differentdispensers. Depending on where the measurement is taken and where thefraud is perpetrated, the flow rate may be higher or lower in thefraudulent dispensers as compared to the nonfraudulent dispensers.However, regardless of where and how, there will be a difference for thefraudulent dispensers.

The third scheme includes measuring the time required to dispense fuelat each dispenser. If one dispenser consistently dispenses fuel at timeincrements different than other fuel dispenser, it may be a modifieddispenser perpetrating a fraud on the unsuspecting customer.

The fourth scheme includes monitoring for increases or decreases in theflow rate at one dispenser that do not occur at other dispensers at thesite. The fuel dispenser that has a different performance profile mayhave been modified. The changes may occur between transactions or evenwithin a single transaction.

The fifth scheme includes using the tank monitor to evaluate how muchfuel has been drawn out of the underground storage tank for a givenfueling transaction. This can be compared with the amount of fuel thatthe fuel dispenser reports that it dispensed. If the two numbers are notcomparable, then it is likely that the fuel dispenser has been modified.

The sixth scheme is actually a variation on the first five schemescombined in that any of the first five schemes could be used, but thatinstead of comparing the reported value to a source of information whichis believed to be uncorrupted, the reported value is compared to a knownfraudulent data profile. If the two are similar, then fraud is inferredand an alarm may be generated.

Other schemes may also be possible, or the schemes presented hereincould be expanded or combined so that the fuel dispenser in question iscompared not only to other fuel dispensers at the fueling station, butalso to some regional or national average for similar fuel dispensers.This may be particularly appropriate where it is a regional or centraloffice that is attempting to detect the fraud and not a single fuelingstation.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

FIG. 1 is a typical fuel dispenser designed to dispense fuel from theconnected underground storage tank;

FIG. 2 is a fueling station employing the fuel dispensers of FIG. 1;

FIG. 3 is a schematic drawing of a plurality of fueling stationsconnected to a central fraud detection computer;

FIG. 4 is a flow diagram of the decisional logic associated with a firstfraud detection scheme;

FIG. 5 is a flow diagram of the decisional logic associated with asecond fraud detection scheme;

FIG. 6 is a flow diagram of the decisional logic associated with a thirdfraud detection scheme; and

FIG. 7 is a flow diagram of the decisional logic associated with afourth fraud detection scheme.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE PREFERRED EMBODIMENTS

The present invention uses a number of different techniques to detectfraud within a fueling transaction. However, a discussion of thephysical elements comprising a fuel dispensing environment will behelpful as a background against which the present fraud detectionschemes are implemented.

Turning now to FIG. 1, a fuel dispenser 10 is adapted to deliver a fuel,such as gasoline or diesel fuel to a vehicle 12 through a delivery hose14, and more particularly through a nozzle 16 and spout 18. The vehicle12 includes a fill neck and a tank (not shown), which accepts the fueland provides it through appropriate fluid connections to the engine (notshown) of the vehicle 12. A display 13 provides a user interface fromwhich the user can determine a cost associated with a particular fuelingtransaction. While display 13 is preferably a visual display, it mayequivalently be an audio user interface, such as might be used by thevisually impaired or the like.

Flexible delivery hose 14 includes a product delivery line 36 and avapor return line 34. Both lines 34 and 36 are fluidly connected to anunderground storage tank (UST) 40 through the fuel dispenser 10. Once inthe fuel dispenser 10, the lines 34 and 36 separate at split 51. Pump42, controlled by motor 44 extracts fuel from the UST 40 and provides itto product delivery line 36. This can be done by creating a vacuum inline 36 or other equivalent means. Additionally a single pump 42 andmotor 44 may serve a plurality of fuel dispensers 10, or a single fueldispenser 10.

A vapor recovery system is typically present in the fuel dispenser 10.During delivery of fuel into the vehicle fuel tank, the incoming fueldisplaces air containing fuel vapors. Vapor is recovered from the gastank of the vehicle 12 through the vapor return line 34 with theassistance of a vapor pump 52. A motor 53 powers the vapor pump 52. Acontrol system 50 receives information from a meter 56 and a pulser 58in the fuel delivery line 36. Meter 56 measures the fuel being dispensedwhile the pulser 58 generates a pulse per count of the meter 56. Typicalpulsers 58 generate one thousand (1000) pulses per gallon of fueldispensed. Control system 50 controls a drive pulse source 55 that inturn controls the motor 53. The control system 50 may be amicroprocessor with an associated memory or the like and also operatesto control the various functions of the fuel dispenser including, butnot limited to: fuel transaction authorization, fuel grade selection,display and/or audio control. The vapor recovery pump 52 may be avariable speed pump or a constant speed pump with or without acontrolled valve (not shown) as is well known in the art. Additionally,the pump 42 and motor 44 may be controlled by the control system 50directly and provide operating data thereto.

Additionally, a vapor flow sensor 54 may be positioned in the vaporreturn line 34. Vapor flow sensor 54 may not only sense vapor flowwithin the vapor return line, but also sense hydrocarbon concentrationto provide a total volume of hydrocarbons recovered from the gas tank ofthe vehicle 12. In some systems, vapor recovery is dictated by the rateof fuel dispensing, however, in systems equipped with a sensor 54, vaporrecovery operates at least semi-independently of fuel dispensing.

To combat fraud in the fuel dispenser 10, a number of differentembodiments of the present invention are offered. These may beimplemented in the fuel dispenser 10 or as shown in FIG. 2, in a centralfuel station building 62 within a fueling environment 60. Fuelingenvironment 60 includes the fuel station building 62, a plurality offuel dispensers 10, a central station computer 66, and a potentiallyfraudulent dispenser 68. Dispensers 10 and 68 are fluidly connected tothe UST 40, in which is positioned a UST sensor 64. UST sensor 64measures the level of fluid within the UST 40. Such sensors 64 are wellknown in the art and can provide extremely accurate measurements of theamount of fuel presently within the UST 40. They may be float sensors orpressure sensors or the like, but are sensitive enough to detect minutechanges in the present volume of fuel within the UST 40. Most USTsensors 64 are compensated so that the natural expansion and contractionof the fuel according to the vagaries of the atmospheric temperature andpressure are accounted for in the calculation of the volume of fuelpresent in the UST 40.

Central station computer 66 is communicatively connected to each of thedispensers 10 and 68 as well as UST sensor 64 and is preferably theG-SITE® sold by the assignee of the present invention. Further, centralstation computer 66 may be connected to each pump 42 and motor 44 withinthe fueling environment 60. Thus, central station computer 66 is suitedfor use in the fraud detection schemes of the present invention.Further, the fueling environments 60 may interconnected one to anotherand to a corporate headquarters or regional office as seen in FIG. 3.

Specifically, FIG. 3 represents a network 80 that includes a pluralityof fueling environments 60, each with a plurality of fuel dispensers 10and a central station computer 66, as well as a central office 82 thatincludes a central corporate computer 84. Computers 66 and 84 may beconnected by the Internet or other dedicated network 86, such as a widearea network (WAN) as needed or desired. Central office 82 may be aregional office responsible for fraud detection in a geographic regionor a national office responsible for fraud detection throughout thenation. While labeled a corporate computer 84, it should be appreciatedthat a franchisee who owns multiple fueling environments 60 couldimplement the fraud detection system of the present invention at acentral office without having more than a nominal corporate nature.Other computers in communication with multiple fueling environments 60are also intended to be included within the scope of the term “corporatecomputer” even if they are not tied to a corporate entity. Computers 66and 84 communicate one to the other as needed or desired and may passinformation about fuel dispensers 10 therebetween.

Fraud may be perpetrated in a number of ways in a fueling environment60. A first type of fraud comprises throttling back the motor 44 andpump 42 while still reporting to the control system 50 that a normalflow rate is passing through the flow meter 56. For example, normallythe pump 42 pumps eight gallons of fuel per minute. Meter 56 registersthis flow rate and the pulser makes 8000 pulses per minute. Controlsystem 50 receives these 8000 pulses and reports correctly that eightgallons are dispensed per minute. If the motor 44 is throttled back, itmay only pump six gallons of fuel per minute, but the pulser 58 stillgenerates 8000 pulses and the control system 50 believes that eightgallons of fuel are dispensed per minute. There may be other ways tomodify the flow of fuel delivery while still convincing the controlsystem 50 that a normal fueling rate is occurring.

Alternatively, the pulser 58 could merely be accelerated to generate agreater number of pulses per gallon of fuel that passes through themeter 56. The control system 50 still believes that 1000 pulses isequivalent to one gallon. For example, eight gallons are dispensed perminute, but the pulser 58 generates 10,000 pulses in that minute, andthe control system 50 believes that ten gallon of fuel are dispensed perminute.

Note further that the pulser 58 may operate correctly in eithersituation, but an additional device, which synthesizes the desired,elevated frequency pulse train, may be interposed between the pulser 58and the control system 50. Alternatively, the pulser 58 could beoperating correctly, but how the control system 50 interpreted theoutput could be modified. There are other fraudulent schemes that existas well. The present invention, if properly implemented, may detect mostor all of these schemes.

Vapor Analysis

The first fraud detecting scheme is illustrated in FIG. 4 wherein thefuel dispenser 10, and particularly the control system 50 receives afuel dispensing rate from the meter 56 and pulser 58 (block 100).Simultaneously, the vapor recovery system recovers vapor (block 102).Vapor recovery sensor 54 passes a reading to the control system 50bearing on the amount of vapor recovered (block 104) from which thecontrol system 50 can determine the volume of hydrocarbon vaporrecovered during the fueling transaction. By comparing the volume ofhydrocarbons recovered to the amount of fuel allegedly dispensed (block106), an inference can be made as to the existence of fraud in thesystem.

In a first aspect of the invention, the control system 50 compares thevolume of hydrocarbon vapor recovered to the amount of fuel dispensed(block 106). If the volumes are not comparable, or within a certainallowable range (block 108), then it may be indicative that the fueldispenser has been modified to produce fraudulent transactions and analarm may be generated (block 110). This test basically determines thatif the fuel dispenser 10 indicates on its display that ten gallons offuel were dispensed, then an appropriate amount of hydrocarbon vaporshould have been recovered. If ten gallons of vapor were recovered, butthe concentration or volume of hydrocarbon vapor was too low, that maybe indicative that the vapor recovery system is recovering atmosphericvapor, and the actual amount of fuel dispensed was not ten gallons.

In a second aspect of the invention, the control system 50 compares thevolumetric rate of hydrocarbon vapor recovery to a historical log ofvolumetric rate of hydrocarbon vapor recovery (block 106). If the ratesare not comparable or meet some predetermined criterion or criteria(block 108) then an alarm may be generated (block 110). This testbasically determines that if the fuel dispenser 10 indicates that tengallons of fuel were dispensed, and historically that meant that tengallons of hydrocarbon vapor were recovered, but that now only eightgallons of hydrocarbon vapor were recovered, that may be indicative thatthe fuel dispenser 10 has been modified to perpetrate fraud.

In a third aspect of the invention, the control system 50 compares therate of vapor recovery from the beginning of the fueling transaction tothe end of the fueling transaction (block 106). If the rate dips, orotherwise changes for an inexplicable reason then block 108 is answerednegatively, and an alarm may be generated (block 110). This testbasically determines that if the fuel dispenser 10 was recovering onegallon of hydrocarbon vapor per ten seconds during the first part of thetransaction, but later is recovering eight tenths of a gallon ofhydrocarbon vapor per ten seconds that there may be a fraudulenttransaction occurring. Note that an upward increase could likewise causean alarm.

In a fourth aspect of the invention, the central station computer 66 maycompare the rate of vapor recovery to rates of vapor recovery to otherfuel dispensers 10 at the fueling environment 60 (block 106). If therates are not comparable (block 108), then the computer 66 may inferthat there is fraud and generate an alarm (block 110). This testbasically compares the volumetric rate of hydrocarbon vapor recoverybetween multiple fuel dispensers 10. If one fuel dispenser 10 isrecovering hydrocarbon vapor more or less efficiently than the otherfuel dispensers 10, then it may have been modified into a fraudulentdispenser 68.

In a fifth aspect of the invention, the corporate computer 84 maycompare the rate of hydrocarbon vapor recovery from a particular fuelingenvironment 60, and perhaps a particular fuel dispenser 10 to a regionalor national average hydrocarbon vapor recovery rate as determined byaveraging hydrocarbon vapor recovery rates from any number of or allfuel environments 60 communicatively coupled to the corporate computer84 (block 106). It should be appreciated that the average need not be atrue average per se, it can be any acceptable statistical model that isrepresentative of a typical hydrocarbon vapor recovery rate. If themeasured vapor recovery rate does not meet a predetermined criteria(block 108), then an alarm may be generated (block 110). This is similarto the fourth aspect, but has a broader base to catch fraudulentdispensers 68. Whereas the fourth aspect may not catch a fraudulentdispenser 68 if all dispensers 10 have been modified, the fifth aspectprobably would catch a fueling environment 60 that had been completelymodified to perpetrate fraud.

Further note that regardless of how the fraud was perpetrated, thismethod is useful in fraud detection unless the fraud feasor alsomodified the vapor recovery system. Note also that this technique iswell suited for catching consumer perpetrated fraud as well in that aslong as the vapor readings and the reported amount of fuel dispensedreadings are not within tolerable limits, an alarm may be generatedindicating fraud.

Flow Rate Analysis

A second embodiment is seen in FIG. 5 wherein the flow rate of the fuelbeing dispensed is compared to an expected flow rate. If the pump 42 hasbeen throttled back, and the pulser 58 is providing inaccurate data tothe control system 50, then the rate per gallon as reported by the pump42 or motor 44 on average for non-fraudulent transactions should besignificantly higher than the flow rate exhibited during fraudulentsales. For example, if a non-fraudulent fuel sale of ten gallons isdelivered at an average of eight gallons per minute, a fraudulent fuelsale of eight gallons (but presented to the consumer as ten gallons)should exhibit a markedly lower average flow rate, perhaps six gallonsper minute as reported by the pump 42. If however, the pulser 58 hasbeen accelerated without modification to pump 42, then the controlsystem will show a flow rate that is much higher than the actual flowrate as well as one that appears faster than normal non-fraudulentsales.

In a first aspect of this second embodiment, the fuel dispenser 10, andparticularly the meter 56, reports to the control system 50 a measuredflow rate of the fuel presently being dispensed (block 120). Controlsystem 50 compares the reported flow rate to a historical flow rateestablished by the fuel dispenser 10 (block 122). If the flow rate failsto meet some criterion or criteria (block 124) then an alarm may begenerated (block 126). Note that for a given fuel dispenser 10, theaverage flow rate should remain relatively constant from transaction totransaction, thus the historical data would have to be establishedbefore any tampering to be effective. This could be done during factorycalibration or immediately after installation to reduce the risk of thehistorical data being fraudulent from the outset. However, if thehistorical data is accurate, any change or deviation therefrom may beindicative of tampering.

In a second aspect of this embodiment, the fuel dispenser 10 measuresthe flow rate of the fuel presently being dispensed (block 120). This isreported to the central station computer 66, which then compares thereported flow to an average flow rate for all the fuel dispensers 10within the fueling environment 60 (block 122). If the flow rate fails tomeet some criterion or criteria (block 124) then an alarm may begenerated (block 126). This aspect is effective when only a few of thefuel dispensers 68 have been corrupted within a given fuelingenvironment 60. These fuel dispensers 68 will show different averagefueling rates from the fuel dispensers 10 which have not been corrupted,and the appropriate alarm may be generated.

In a third aspect of this embodiment, each fuel dispenser 10 measures anaverage flow rate of fuel presently being dispensed (block 120) andreports to the central station computer 66. Central station computer 66periodically reports the average flow rates for each fuel dispenser 10within the fueling environment 60 to the central corporate computer 84.Corporate computer 84 then compares the reported average flow rates toan average established by some or all of the fuel dispensers 10 thatprovide reports to the computer 84, either directly or indirectly. Thisaspect is particularly useful in catching fueling environments 60 inwhich every fuel dispenser 68 has been corrupted. To reduce the load onthe network 86, the average fueling rates may be reported periodicallyrather than during every fueling transaction. This should be automatedand have as little chance as possible for human intervention, otherwise,data tampering may occur, reducing the likelihood that the fraud isdetected.

In a fourth aspect of this embodiment, the average flow rate is comparedto a maximum allowable flow rate of which the fuel dispenser 10 iscapable. For example, some fuel dispensers 10 have a maximum flow rateof ten gallons per minute. If the fuel dispenser 10 indicates that it isdelivering twelve gallons per minute, it is likely that the fueldispenser 10 has been corrupted or modified.

In a fifth aspect of this embodiment, pump 42 or motor 44 reports to thecontrol system 50 at what rate fuel is being removed from the UST 40 toprovide the flow rate of the fuel being dispensed (block 120). Thisvalue is compared to the amount the control system 50 believes is beingdispensed (block 122). Control system 50 determines if the valuescompared meet some predetermined criterion or criteria (block 124). Ifthey do not, an alarm may be generated (block 126).

In a sixth aspect of this embodiment, the pump 42 or the motor 44reports the speed at which fuel is being removed from the UST 40 to thecentral station computer 66 (block 120). Central station computer 66also receives from the control system 50 the amount of fuel that thecontrol system 50 was told had been dispensed. From these two values,the central station computer 66 can make the desired comparison (block122). If the two values are not comparable or otherwise fail to meetsome predetermined criterion or criteria (block 124) an alarm may begenerated (block 126).

In a seventh aspect of this embodiment, the pump 42 or the motor 44reports the speed at which fuel is being removed from the UST 40 to thecorporate computer 84 (block 120), which makes the comparison (block122) and generates an alarm (block 126) if some criterion or criteriaare not met (block 124).

In an eighth aspect of this embodiment, the pump 42 or the motor 44reports the speed at which fuel is being removed from the UST 40 to thecentral station computer 66 (block 120). Central station computer 66compares the rate of fuel flow at that particular dispenser 10 to theaverage fuel flow rates at other dispensers 10 within the fuelingenvironment 60 (block 122). If the flow rate in question does not meetsome predetermined criterion or criteria (block 124) then an alarm maybe generated (block 126).

In a ninth aspect of this embodiment, the pump 42 or the motor 44reports the speed at which fuel is being removed from the UST 40 to thecorporate computer 84 (block 120). Corporate computer 84 compares theflow rate to an average flow rate as established by the flow ratesreported from a plurality of fueling environments 60 (block 122). If themeasured value does not meet some predetermined criterion or criteria(block 124) an alarm may be generated.

In a tenth aspect of this embodiment, the central station computer 66generates an average measured flow rate from the various pumps 42 ormotors 44 within the fueling environment (block 120) and reports thisaverage to the corporate computer 84. Corporate computer 84 thencompares the average flow rate for a particular fueling environmentagainst an average flow rate for comparably situated fuelingenvironments (block 122). If the reported average flow rate does notmeet some predetermined criterion or criteria (block 124) an alarm maybe generated.

In an eleventh aspect of the present invention, the flow rate of thedispenser 10 is measured and compared to other flow rates measuredduring the same fueling transaction. If the flow rates vary past certainallowable parameters within a single transaction, this may be indicativeof fraud, and an alarm may be generated. The comparison can be done bythe control system 50, the central station computer 66, or even thecorporate computer 84 as needed or desired.

Note that for the analysis to be the most probative, the make and modelof the fuel dispensers 10 being compared are preferably the same. It maybe meaningless to compare model X to model Y if they are designed tohave different fueling rates. However, different models may be designedto have identical fueling rates and in such a circumstance, thecomparison may still be probative.

Time Required Analysis

A third embodiment is seen in FIG. 6 and is closely related to thesecond embodiment. However, in contrast to the second embodiment, thetotal time required for the fueling transaction is measured and comparedto times required for similar fueling transactions.

A first aspect of this embodiment measures the time required for thefueling transaction (block 130). Control system 50 and an internal timeror the like may accomplish this measurement. At the same time, the meter56 and the pulser 58 provide a measurement of the amount of fueldispensed to the control system 50 (block 132). Control system 50 thencompares the amount of time required to dispense the measured amount offuel to a historical collection of data (block 134). If the measuredvalues fail to meet some criterion or criteria (block 136) an alarm maybe generated (block 138). For example, the fuel dispenser 10 may knowthat it should take seventy-two seconds to dispense twelve gallons basedon the historical data. If the present fuel transaction purports todispense twelve gallons in sixty seconds, then there is an indication offraud.

A second aspect of this embodiment has an external time measuring device70, such as a camera with a timer (FIG. 2) measure the time required fora fueling transaction (block 130). The control system 50 still gathers ameasurement indicative of the amount of fuel allegedly dispensed (block132). The central station computer 66 then compares the time required tothe fuel dispensed (block 134). If the results do not meet somepredetermined criterion (block 136), an alarm maybe generated (block138). This requires the fraudulent actor to modify not only the fueldispenser 68, but also the time measuring device 70 if he is going toperpetrate the fraud, increasing the likelihood of observation ordetection. Note also that the time measuring device 70 could reportdirectly to the control system 50, and control system 50 perform thecomparison.

A third aspect of this embodiment uses the central station computer 66to provide the ability to measure the time required to complete afueling transaction (block 130). Fuel dispenser 10 and specificallycontrol system 50 measure the amount of fuel allegedly dispensed (block132). The central station computer 66 compares the time required to thefuel dispensed (block 134). If the results do not meet somepredetermined criterion (block 136), an alarm may be generated (block138). Again, this requires modifications at two locations for thefraudulent actor, thereby increasing the likelihood of apprehension.

A fourth aspect would be identical to the third aspect, but thecorporate computer 84 would provide the time measuring function. This isnot preferred because of the computational requirements placed on thecorporate computer 84 and the loads placed on the network 86, but itcould be implemented if desired.

A fifth aspect of this embodiment has the central station computer 66collect and average the time required for fueling transactions (block130) as well as the average amount of fuel dispensed (block 132) andpass this to the corporate computer 84. The corporate computer 84compares these averages to predetermined averages (block 134) for theseactivities. If the reported values do not meet some predeterminedcriterion or criteria (block 136) an alarm may be generated (block 138).

This third embodiment is essentially a modification of the averagefueling rate embodiment in that a number of gallons delivered are beingcompared with a time required. However, the actual data that is beingcompared is slightly different—instead of an average fueling rate, twodata points are being compared. The end result is the same, but theimplementation may be different.

Tank Monitor

A fourth embodiment is seen in FIG. 7. This particular embodimentcompares the amount of fuel that the fuel dispenser 10 indicates that itdispensed to the amount of fuel removed from the UST 40. Note that thisembodiment functions best when only one fuel dispenser 10 is drainingfuel from UST 40 at a time, and thus it may be difficult to isolate eachdispenser 10 under such conditions. However, over a period of time,statistically, such isolated fueling events should occur, providing thefraud detection desired. Alternatively, the station owner/operator orthe corporate fraud control agent can periodically perform the tests incontrolled situations.

In a first aspect of this embodiment, the meter 56 and pulser 58 providea measurement of the amount of fuel dispensed to the control system 50(block 140). Sensor 64 measures the amount of fuel removed from the UST40 (block 142) and provides this measurement to the control system 50.Control system 50 then compares the amount of fuel dispensed to theamount of fuel removed (block 144). If the comparison does not meet somepredetermined criterion or criteria (block 146) then an alarm may begenerated (block 148).

In a second aspect of this embodiment, the meter 56 and pulser 58provide a measurement of the amount of fuel dispensed to the centralstation computer 66 (block 140). Sensor 64 provides a measurement of theamount of fuel removed from UST 40 to the central station computer 66(block 142). Central station computer 66 then compares the amount offuel dispensed to the amount of fuel removed (block 144). If thecomparison does not meet some predetermined criterion (block 146) thenan alarm may be generated (block 148).

In a third aspect of this embodiment, the measurements of blocks 140 and142 could be provided to the corporate computer 84 and the comparisonperformed remotely from the fueling environment 60.

In a fourth aspect of this embodiment, the central computer station 66could collect an average sensor 64 reading per transaction to thecorporate computer 84 (block 142) and the corporate computer 84 couldthen perform the comparison (block 144). If the station average did notmeet some predetermined criterion or criteria (block 146) then an alarmcould be generated.

Sensor 64 is sensitive enough that even the occurrence of a single“short deliver” of 20% may be detectable for a ten or fifteen gallondelivery. Additionally, while it is preferred that this to comparisonoccur during times when only a single fuel dispenser 10 is draining fuelfrom UST 40, it is possible to attempt the comparison when two or morefuel dispensers are operating. The fact that an anomalous result occursindicates that one or more of the fuel dispensers 10 that drained fuelfrom UST 40 when the anomalous result occurred are potentiallyfraudulent. Repeated events could isolate the questionable fueldispenser 68, or the anomalous result may trigger a manual inspection ofthe various fuel dispensers 10 until the problem is located.

Compare to Known Fraudulent Data

This embodiment is somewhat akin to any and all of the aboveembodiments. However, instead of comparing the reported values to aknown acceptable value, the reported values could be compared to a knownfraudulent value. Thus, all of the above processes could be repeated,but in the comparison to the predetermined reference, the predeterminedreference would be a known fraudulent data point. If the two values wereidentical or within some predetermined confidence interval, an alarmcould be generated indicating that the tested dispenser 68 wasfraudulent, the tested fueling environment 60 was fraudulent or thelike, depending on exactly what had been tested.

It should be noted that these solutions are not mutually exclusive, aplurality of such solutions could be implemented. Different aspects ofthe same embodiment could be implemented simultaneously or differentembodiments could be combined to greatly increase the likelihood thatfraud is detected and corrected. This will increase consumer confidenceand protect the goodwill of the companies responsible for selling fuelfrom the illegal activities of rogue franchisees. Further, while thetests enunciated above speak in terms of the measured values not meetingsome predetermined criterion or criteria, it should be appreciated thatthe converse is true. Instead of failing a test which indicates that thefuel dispenser 10 is normal, an alarm could be generated when the fueldispenser 10 passes a test that indicates fraud. Both are equivalent andeffectively report the same information, but are phrased slightlydifferently and perhaps implemented differently.

Additionally, as would be expected when decisional logic is executed bya computer or the like, the particular implementations may beimplemented through software or dedicated memory containing hard wiredinstructions on how to perform the desired tasks.

Further, a failure to report data to a corporate computer 84 may also beindicative of fraud. In such an instance, an alarm should be generatedand the station operator interrogated as to why the data was notprovided as required. Alternatively, an independent, manual test couldbe performed at the station unbeknownst to the station operator toconfirm that fraudulent activity is taking place before any questionsare asked.

The present invention may, of course, be carried out in other specificways than those herein set forth without departing from the spirit andessential characteristics of the invention. The present embodiments are,therefore, to be considered in all respects as illustrative and notrestrictive, and all changes coming within the meaning and equivalencyrange of the appended claims are intended to be embraced therein.

What is claimed is:
 1. A method of detecting fraud in a fuel dispenser,wherein the fraud comprises reporting an amount of fuel differing fromthe amount of fuel actually dispensed in a fueling transaction, saidmethod comprising: a) reporting an amount of fuel alleged to bedispensed on the fuel dispenser to create a reported amount; b)comparing the reported amount to a reference related to known fraudulentinformation; and c) determining if the reported amount is within aconfidence interval of said reference to estimate a likelihood that thereported amount differs from the amount of fuel actually dispensed. 2.The method of claim 1 wherein the step of comparing the reported amountto a reference comprises selecting the known fraudulent information fromat least one data source within the group comprising: an analysis ofvapor content recovered by a vapor recovery system; an analysis of timerequired to complete the fueling transaction; an analysis of a flow rateassociated with the fueling transaction; and an analysis of an outputassociated with a storage tank sensor.
 3. The method of claim 1 whereinthe step of comparing the reported amount to a reference is performed bythe fuel dispenser.
 4. The method of claim 3 wherein the step ofcomparing the reported amount to a reference comprises the fueldispenser comparing the reported amount to historically created data. 5.The method of claim 1 wherein the step of comparing the reported amountto a reference is performed by a central station computer.
 6. The methodof claim 1 wherein the step of comparing the reported amount to areference is performed by a computer remote from a fueling environmentin which the fuel dispenser is located.
 7. The method of claim 6 furthercomprising the fuel dispenser passing data bearing on a volume of fueldispensed to said computer remote from the fueling environment togetherwith data bearing on the reported amount such that the computer remotefrom the fueling environment can perform the step of comparing.
 8. Themethod of claim 1 further comprising making a plurality of comparisonsbetween the reported amount and a reference generated during a singlefueling transaction.
 9. The method of claim 1 further comprisinggenerating an alarm if the step of determining if the reported amount iswithin a confidence interval estimates that the reported amount differsfrom the amount of fuel actually dispensed.
 10. The method of claim 1further comprising generating an alarm if the step of comparing fails tobe performed due to a failure to report the reference.
 11. The method ofclaim 1 further comprising generating an alarm if the step of comparingfails to be performed due to a failure to report the reported amount.12. A method of detecting fraud in a fueling environment, wherein thefraud comprises reporting on a fuel dispenser an amount of fueldiffering from the amount of fuel actually dispensed in a fuelingtransaction, said method comprising: a) averaging a reported amount fora plurality of fueling transactions occurring in the fuelingenvironment; b) reporting the average reported amount to a computerremote from the fueling environment; c) comparing the average reportedamount to a reference related to known fraudulent information; and d)determining if the average reported amounts are within a confidenceinterval of said reference to estimate a likelihood that the reportedamount differs from the amount of fuel actually dispensed.
 13. Themethod of claim 12 wherein the step of comparing the average reportedamount to a reference comprises selecting the known fraudulentinformation from at least one data source within the group comprising:an analysis of vapor content recovered by a vapor recovery system; ananalysis of time required to complete the fueling transaction; ananalysis of a flow rate associated with the fueling transaction; and ananalysis of an output associated with a storage tank sensor.
 14. Themethod of claim 12 wherein the step of comparing the average reportedamount to a reference is performed by a computer remote from the fuelingenvironment.
 15. The method of claim 12 further comprising generating analarm if the fueling environment fails to report the average reportedamount.
 16. A fuel dispenser configured to detect fraud in a fuelingtransaction wherein the fraud comprises reporting an amount of fueldiffering from the amount of fuel actually dispensed in a fuelingtransaction, said fuel dispenser comprising: a) a fuel delivery path todeliver fuel to a vehicle; b) a user interface for reporting an amountof fuel allegedly dispensed; and c) a control system for controllingsaid fuel delivery path, wherein said control system determines areference from known fraudulent data and compares said reference to areported amount of fuel alleged to be dispensed through the fueldelivery path during the fueling transaction and wherein said controlsystem determines if the reported amount is within a confident intervalof said reference to estimate a likelihood that the reported amountdiffers from the amount of fuel actually dispensed.
 17. The fueldispenser of claim 16 wherein said user interface is a visual display.18. The fuel dispenser of claim 16 wherein said user interface is anaudio user interface.
 19. The fuel dispenser of claim 16 wherein saidreference is calculated from at least one data source within the groupcomprising: an analysis of vapor content recovered by a vapor recoverysystem; an analysis of time required to complete the fuelingtransaction; an analysis of a flow rate associated with the fuelingtransaction; and an analysis of an output associated with a storage tanksensor.
 20. The fuel dispenser of claim 16 wherein said control systemmakes a plurality of comparisons during a single fueling transactionbetween concurrently reported amounts of fuel dispensed and a referencederived from the vapor recovered.
 21. The fuel dispenser of claim 19wherein said control system is configured to pass the data to a centralstation computer.
 22. The fuel dispenser of claim 19 wherein saidcontrol system is configured to pass the data to a computer remote fromthe fuel dispenser.
 23. A central station computer configured to detectfraud in a fueling transaction wherein the fraud comprises reporting anamount of fuel differing from the amount of fuel actually dispensed in afueling transaction, said central station computer configured to:receive a reported amount of fuel alleged to be dispensed on a fueldispenser; compare the reported amount to a reference derived from knownfraudulent data; and determine if the reported amount is within aconfidence interval of said reference to estimate a likelihood that thereported amount differs from an amount of fuel actually dispensed. 24.The central station computer of claim 23 wherein said computer isfurther configured to select the known fraudulent information from atleast one data source within the group comprising: an analysis of vaporcontent recovered by a vapor recovery system; an analysis of timerequired to complete the fueling transaction; an analysis of a flow rateassociated with the fueling transaction; and an analysis of all outputassociated with a storage tank sensor.
 25. The central station computerof claim 23 wherein said computer is further configured to perform aplurality of comparisons during a single fueling transaction.
 26. Acomputer remote from a fueling environment configured to detect fraud ina fuel dispenser wherein the fraud comprises reporting an amount of fueldiffering from the amount of fuel actually dispensed in a fuelingtransaction, said computer configured to: receive data related to areported amount of fuel alleged to be dispensed on a fuel dispenser;compare the data related to a reported amount to a reference derivedfrom known fraudulent data; and determine if the data related to areported amount is within a confidence interval of said reference toestimate a likelihood that the reported amount differs from an amount offuel actually dispensed.
 27. The computer of claim 26 wherein the datarelated to a reported amount of fuel alleged to be dispensed on a fueldispenser comprises a fueling environment average.
 28. The computer ofclaim 26 wherein the data related to a reported amount of fuel allegedto be dispensed on a fuel dispenser comprises an average reported amountfrom a single fuel dispenser accumulated over a plurality of fuelingtransactions.
 29. The computer of claim 26 wherein said reference isdetermined by comparing data from a plurality of fueling environments.30. The computer of claim 26 wherein said computer is configured togenerate an alarm if said computer does not receive the data.
 31. A fueldispenser configured to detect fraud in a fueling transaction whereinthe fraud comprises reporting an amount of fuel differing from theamount of fuel actually dispensed in a fueling transaction, said fueldispenser comprising: a) a fuel delivery path to deliver fuel to avehicle; b) a user interface for reporting an amount of fuel allegedlydispensed; and c) a control system for controlling said fuel deliverypath, wherein said control system is configured to pass informationrelated to a reported amount of fuel allegedly dispensed to a computerremote from the fuel dispenser for comparison to a reference derivedfrom known fraudulent data to estimate a likelihood that the reportedamount differs from the amount of fuel actually dispensed.
 32. The fueldispenser of claim 31 wherein said reference is calculated from at leastone data source within the group comprising: an analysis of vaporcontent recovered by a vapor recovery system; an analysis of timerequired to complete the fueling transaction; an analysis of a flow rateassociated with the fueling transaction; and an analysis of an outputassociated with a storage tank sensor.
 33. A computer readable mediumincluding software configured to accept data related to a reportedamount of fuel alleged to be dispensed in a fueling transaction at afuel dispenser and comparing said data to a reference derived from knownfraudulent data to estimate a likelihood that the reported amountdiffers from an amount of fuel actually dispensed in the fuelingtransaction.
 34. The computer readable medium of claim 33 wherein saidreference is calculated from at least one data source within the groupcomprising: an analysis of vapor content recovered by a vapor recoverysystem; an analysis of time required to complete the fuelingtransaction; an analysis of a flow rate associated with the fuelingtransaction; and an analysis of an output associated with a storage tanksensor.